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Abstract 
Purpose – This work seeks to investigate what post crisis principles, banks have taken in 
a  bid to  manage  liquidity  risk.  Its  basis  is  founded on the ground that,  the  financial 
liquidity market was greatly affected during the recent economic turmoil and financial 
meltdown; when liquidity management disclosure was imperative for confidence building 
in depositors and shareholders. 
Design/methodology/approach – The study investigates Basel II pillar 3 disclosures on 
liquidity risk management in 20 of the top 33 world banks. Bank selection is based on 
available information, geographical balance and language permissibility. Information is 
searched from the World Wide Web; with a minimum of one hour allocated  for ‘content  
search’; notwithstanding time spell for ‘content analysis’. When information on liquidity 
risk management is found, content scrutiny is guided by 16 disclosure principles; clubbed 
in four categories.
  
Findings – Just 25% of sampled banks provide explicitly public accessible liquidity risk 
management information. This is a stark indication that, even in the post-crisis era, many 
top  ranking  banks  do  not  still  take  seriously  Basel  disclosure  norms;  especially  the 
February 2008 pre-crisis warning of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 
Implications/limitations  –  Stakeholders  of  banks  should  easily  have  access  to 
information on liquidity risk management. Banks falling short of this might not breed 
confidence in customers and shareholders in event of financial panic and turmoil. Like in 
the run-up to the previous financial crisis, if banks are not compelled to explicitly and 
expressly disclose what measures they adopt in a bid to guarantee stakeholder liquidity ; 
the  onset  of  any  financial  shake-up  would  only  precipitate  a  meltdown.  The  main 
limitation of this study is; the World Wide Web is used as the only source of information 
for bank stakeholders. 
Originality/value – The contribution of this paper to literature can be viewed from the 
role  it  plays  in  investigating  what  post-crisis  measures  banks  have  taken  to  inform 
stakeholders on how they manage liquidity risk.
Keywords: Post crisis, Liquidity risk management, Bank.
Paper type: Qualitative finance research paper.
JEL Classification: D80, E50, G00, G18.
1. Introduction
The palaver of liquidity risk management (LRM) has become increasingly vital in 
the banking industry,  especially with the advent of financial  meltdown and economic 
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down turn. During the recent crisis, increasing credit concerns and feeble market liquidity 
animated  a  cycle  of  deteriorating  asset  market  values  and  deleveraging.  Inter-bank 
lending came to a halt;  credit  risk and capital  flight  became the order to day-to-day. 
World  authorities  sort  to  find  a  solution  as  banks  were  on  their  knees  in  quest  for 
liquidity; with interbank lending losing steam. Many financial institutions were bailed-
out  or  restructured.  The  inability  of  a  bank  to  meet  up  with  its  financial 
obligation/liability is a premise on which crisis  may result.  This issue may be due to 
deterioration in asset quality or general loss of confidence in financial institutions due to 
circumstances more or less related to the bank in question. It therefore becomes imperial 
for banks to develop policies and standards that best measure and manage their liquidity 
positions on an on-going basis; beyond this, it is also necessary to project how funding 
liquidity issues, in event of crisis could arise(stress testing and scenario analyses). In this 
paper we attempt to piece together standard practices of bank LRM, while keeping a 
close  on  ‘Basel  II  pillar  3’  disclosure  criteria.  The  spirit  behind  leaning  on  Basel 
principles is founded on the premise that:  in February 2008, the Basel Committee on 
Banking  Supervision  published  ‘Liquidity  Risk  Management  and  Supervisory 
Challenges’1.  Shortcomings emphasized there-in spelled that,  banks had failed to take 
account  of a number of fundamental  principles  of LRM: a great  many firms did not 
conduct  stress  tests  and  scenario  analysis  because  they  did  not  consider  severe  and 
prolonged  liquidity  disruptions  as  very  likely.  The  ensuing  financial  meltdown  only 
further justified and fortified this report. It is therefore our goal to investigate what post-
crisis disclosure measures have been taken into account by top world banks.  
2. Literature review
2.1 Literature on liquidity risk management
Measuring and managing liquidity go hand-in-glove; a good liquidity monitoring 
and measurement policy determines more or less management decisions on bank liquidity 
positions on an on-going basis; especially in periods of adverse scenarios like financial 
1The report emphasized that banks did not have an adequate framework that ideally accounted for the 
liquidity risk presented by individual products and business lines. Most banks did not take into 
consideration the amount of liquidity, crucial for contingency obligations.
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crisis. A case in literature related to bank periodical liquidity management,  especially 
during intra-day outages is the work of   Merrouche and Schanz (2010); whose focus on 
the U.K payment system suggests that, early in the day, when settlement banks are not 
sure that their counter-parties to whom they make payments would pay-back, they stop 
doing  so.  In  this  wise,  healthy  banks  remain  unaffected  by  disruptions  caused  by 
operation  outage,  thus  preventing  affected  banks  acting  as  liquidity  sinks.  This  is 
because, a bank with operational outage receives money both from the central banks and 
other banks but is unable to make payments due to  more or less, an information and/or 
technology issue; this could pose a systematic risk if not sufficiently monitored at the 
beginning of the day.
Concerning  the  use  of  market  positions,  Dinger  (2009),  completely  tests  a 
hypothesis resulting from the works of Demirgüc-Kunt et al. (1998) and Detregiache and 
Gupta  (2004),  which  support  the  thesis  that,  foreign  banks have  a  stabilizing  impact 
because they have access to diversified international  sources of liquidity.  He presents 
evidence that, transitional banks behavior significantly differs from that of local banks in 
the perspective that: during stable periods they hold less liquid reserves than local banks; 
and in crisis, hold more liquid reserves. He (Dinger, 2009) further justifies; transnational 
banks also smooth the local money market volatility in small emerging economies and 
help in integration of interbank markets. Qian et al. (2004), look at the problem from the 
view of a financial system design. In comparing banks in a dynamic economy, they find 
out: both the banking system and the market can provide partial liquidity insurance to 
investors. Evidence show: a full-participation market with intergenerational trading can 
provide more liquidity and insurance through wealth transfer across generations.
As  regards  some form of  contingency planning,  we might  mention  Ratnovski 
(2009),  who stresses  the  need  for  a  good lender  of  last  resort  policy;  which  should 
incorporate  bank capital  information and therefore reduce distorting rents.  This arises 
because; this sub-optimal liquidity solution could be very costly in terms of rents if a 
proper assessment of their  assets is not taking into account.  Therefore,  in compliance 
with this last resort lender requirement, he recommends much focus on ex-post positive 
capitalization than ex-ante liquidity.  To put this perspective clear; banks with positive 
liquidity ex-ante of crisis that the central bank supports may not necessarily have positive 
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net  worth  ex-post;  making  sub-optimal  liquidity  solutions  based  on  ex-ante  liquidity 
positions unsustainable ex-post. It is therefore in the banks interest to insure; this policy 
is not conditioned on liquidity but in ascertained net worth; since quantitative liquidity 
requirement is very expensive. 
Looking at  what  role  country  specific  effects  could  play  on  LRM disclosure, 
Vento  and  La  Ganga  (2009)  assess;  disparity  in  regulatory  and  supervisory  regimes 
across countries could significantly affect bank LRM and supervision. Our work will also 
seek to see how this hypothesis is applicable from a disclosure framework2. Concerning 
cultural specific effects, we could mention Islamic banks, where-by; Ismal (2010) in an 
empirical  survey  on  the  Indonesian  Islamic  banking  industry  indentifies  rational 
depositors sensitivity to interest  rate return and higher portions of short term deposits 
(one month), as the main sources of liquidity palaver. Meanwhile liquidity instruments 
which help in attenuating these liquidity issues include (in decreasing order): borrowing 
from the Islamic money market; borrowing from parent company; withdrawing private 
placements from other banks; use of bank capital to cover demanded liquidity; selling of 
Islamic securities in secondary market; asking for depositors to wait for extra days and 
use of intra day emergency liquidity facility. 
2.2 Literature on bank information disclosure
From a financial intermediary perspective, Chen and Hassan (2006) demonstrate 
that,  improving  banking  transparency  from the  prism of  increase  in  the  precision  of 
public  signals3 may  increase  the  likelihood  of  a  contagious  bank-run.  However  this 
inauspicious  account,  it  suffices  to  reveal:  other  definitions  for  improvement  in 
transparency exist. For instance, if transparency is defined as the way the banking system 
ameliorates the manner in which depositors know whether problems of failed banks are 
systematic or idiosyncratic in nature; then improvement of transparency from this angle 
should instead  dwarf  a  contagious  run.  The skepticism of  Chen and Hassan(2006) is 
shared  by  some  authors.  For  instance, Cordella  and  Yeyati  (1998)  posit  that,  full 
transparency of bank risks, could lead to bank failure via increasing interest on deposits 
2 This will enable us investigate if banks within a given country have peculiar disclosure patterns.
3 For example, when banks invest at time ‘0’, public signals about the projects are revealed at time ‘1’. 
However, the time interval between investment and public knowledge could still be sub-divided. 
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that could accrue from riskier positions.  This risk of disclosure is further emphasized by 
Admati  and Pfleiderer  (2000),  who access  that,  when firms  are  positively correlated, 
disclosing information on one could affect others; especially if the revealed information 
can trigger a contagious run. A study that somewhat antagonizes this thesis is that of 
Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2008), find out: banks in countries which better comply with Basel 
Core Principles related to information provision, receive more favorable Moody financial 
strength ratings. 
Regarding what type of information our research might be concerned with, Boot 
and Thakor (2001), in asking the kind of information firms should voluntarily disclose, 
consider three types of disclosures: (1) information that complements that available only 
to informed investors; (2) information that complements that available to all investors; (3) 
a substitute to information that informed investors would have obtained themselves. From 
the perspective of this study, our search for information from the World Wide Web falls 
within the first  and second categories;  this  is founded on the hypothesis  that:  “inside 
information can hardly be obtained from a public source”. 
Therefore, the present work will aim to: (1) verify if banks have adopted more 
appealing  post-crisis  disclosure  principles  on  LRM  (Basel  Committee  on  Banking 
Supervision,  February  2008);  (2)  investigate  if  country  regulatory  and  supervisory 
regimes, play a role in determining disclosure patterns (Vento and La Ganga, 2009); and 
finally  (3)  determine  summarily  whether  such  explicit  disclosure  is  relevant  for 
stakeholder confidence; as opposed to Chen and Hassan (2006).  
3. Methods
3.1 Content search 
By ‘content’,  we refer  to  information  on LRM. As  shown on table  I,  the  20 
selected banks are among the top 33; according to a recent classification4. Chosen banks 
are  selected  such  that,  their  corresponding  countries  are  members  of  the  Basel 
Committee. We rely principally on the World Wide Web for information because: firstly,  
it  is  the  most  widely  accessible  source  of  information  for  present  and   potential 
stakeholders(clients  and  shareholders);  secondly,  most  banks  have  an  international 
4 Rankings as of 11 August 2010; from Bankers Almanac. 
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character, which makes the web and particularly their websites, the turning point of any 
information  concerning  them.  We  sacrifice  at  least  one  hour  in  search  for  LRM 
information. This is on account of the fact that, we hypothetically assume ; on average, a 
present or prospective stakeholder should spend such amount of time perusing for such 
information.  On the World Wide Web and corresponding websites,  we use searching 
sentences  like:  “liquidity  risk  management”,  “cash  risk  management”,  “liquidity 
management”, “cash management”, “liquidity risk”, “Basel II pillar 3 disclosure”, “Basel 
II”, “pillar disclosure”…..etc. Targeted content from annual reports are post 2008. 
3.2 Content analysis  
This is a form of qualitative analysis that deals specifically with documents and 
texts. Understanding disclosures we find, falls within this framework. We endeavor to 
verify  how  well  and  far  they  reflect  underlying  disclosure  principles  below.  LRM 
disclosures  according  to  Basel  II,  pillar  3,  should  include:  risk  identification  and 
assessment;  risk  management  and  mitigation;  and  risk  monitoring  and  reporting.  In 
perusal for and analysis of such, we focus on the following:
-development of a structure for managing liquidity;  where: strategic risk management, 
tactical  risk  management,  adequacy  of  information  system,  managing  structure  of 
liquidity  strategy,  role  of  directors  and  day-to-day  management;   constitute  content 
analysis  basis;
-measurement  and  management  of  net  funding  requirements;  where,  information  on: 
establishment of a measuring and monitoring process, use of “what if” scenarios, and 
review of liquidity management assumptions; are crucial;
-management  of  market  access  and  contingency  planning;  here  clues  on:  managing 
market  access,  contingency  planning,  and  stress  testing  and  scenario  analysis;  are 
necessary; 
-role  of  internal  control,  supervisors  and  public  disclosure  in  improving  liquidity 
management; constitute the last but not the least content analysis criterion. 
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Table I. Presentation of selected banks
Banks World 
Rankings°
Assets 
(million US$)
Capital
(million US$)
 1) BNP Paribas S.A(France) 1st 2,952,221 35,955.52
 2)Royal Bank of Scotland(United Kingdom) 2nd 2,739,361 23,623.45
 3)Credit Agricole(France) 3rd 2,234,350 40,648.49
 4)Barclays Bank Plc(United Kingdom) 4th 2,226,593   4,606.81
 5)Deutsche  Bank(Germany) 5th 2,153,033   2,279.77
 6)Lloyds Banking Group plc(United Kingdom) 6th 1,658,736 16,909.41
 7)JP Morgan Chase and Co.(USA) 7th 1,627,684   1,785.00
 8)Banco Santander S.A(Spain) 8th 1,593,298   5,902.44
 9)The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi(Japan) 9th 1,494,350  12,000.15
10)Société Générale(France) 10th 1,468,725    1,327.12
11)Bank of America-Merrill Lynch(USA) 11th 1,468,725    1,327.12
12)ING(Netherlands) 12th 1,441,673       731.50
13)UBS(Switzerland) 15th 1,296,709       344.36
14)Bank of China(China) 16th 1,281,409   37,181.63
15)The Sumitomo Bank(Japan) 20th 1,162,096     6,670.54
16)Citibank(USA) 21st 1,161,361        751.00
17)Bank of Scotland plc (United Kingdom) 23rd 1,067,890     9,441.30
18)Credit Suisse(Switzerland) 25th    997,705          45.46
19)Banca Intesa(Italy) 26th     896,476     9,525.11
20)ABN Ambro Holding NV(Netherlands) 33rd     673,379     2,657.10
Notes:°Rankings as of 11th of August 2010. Figures are consolidated and date on 31/12/2009. All countries 
above are member of the Basel Committee. U.S.A: United States of America. Source (Bankers Almanac). 
Table II. Banks and Liquidity Risk Management Disclosure (LRMD)
Implicit or No  LRMD Explicit LRMD
BNP Paribas S.A(France) Deutsche  Bank(Germany)
Royal Bank of Scotland(United Kingdom) UBS(Switzerland)
Credit Agricole(France) Barclays Bank Plc(United Kingdom)
JP Morgan Chase and Co.(USA) Lloyds Banking Group plc(United Kingdom)
Banco Santander S.A(Spain) ING(Netherlands)
The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi(Japan)
Société Générale(France)
Bank of America-Merrill Lynch(USA)
Bank of China(China)
The Sumitomo Bank(Japan)
Citibank(USA)
Bank of  Scotland plc(United Kingdom)
Credit Suisse(Switzerland)
Banca Intesa(Italy)
ABN Ambro Holding NV(Netherlands) 
Notes:U.S.A: United States of America. Source (author’s synthesis)
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4. Case Studies
Various case studies are analyzed based on whether their websites or the World 
Wide Web provides explicit or implicit/no LRM information. As summarized on table II, 
while fifteen banks do not have accessible  information,  five do.  Banks with implicit 
LRM information mostly provide details on how they can help the client manage his/her 
liquidity. Their information is meant to inform clients on how well they can make their 
deposits profitably than, on what measures they will take to make sure they return their 
money upon demand (prevent liquidity risk). They use terms like :“we offer services to 
help you: consolidate your balances; understand your daily cash position; address short 
and long term research objectives;  self  direct  or automate your  investments”(Bank of 
America-Merrill Lynch, for example).Analyzed disclosures are synthesized on tables III, 
IV, V, and VI below.
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Table III. Developing a structure for managing liquidity
Liquidity 
Management 
Principle(s)
Deutsche  Bank UBS Barclays Bank plc Lloyds Banking 
Group plc
ING
Day-to-day 
liquidity 
management 
strategy
“Our liquidity risk management 
approach starts at the intraday level 
(operational liquidity) managing the 
daily payments queue, forecasting cash 
flows and factoring in our access to 
Central Banks”.
“UBS continuously 
tracks its liquidity 
position and asset 
and liability profile 
over time”  “In 
response to the 
market dislocation 
discussed above, 
UBS increased both 
its modeling and 
monitoring 
frequency”.
“The Group policy is that each operation 
must ensure that it has access to sufficient 
intraday liquidity to meet any obligations it 
may have to clearing and settlement 
systems”.
“Daily monitoring 
and control processes 
are in place to 
address both 
statutory and 
prudential liquidity 
requirements.”
“ALCO Bank has delegated 
day-to-day liquidity 
management to Financial 
Markets Amsterdam, which is 
responsible for managing the 
overall liquidity risk position of 
ING Bank…”  
“Within Financial Markets the 
focus is mainly on the daily and 
intraday cash and collateral 
positions and it is policy to 
sufficiently stagger day-to-day 
funding requirements”;
Role of directors
“The underlying policy, including the 
bank’s risk tolerance, is reviewed and 
approved regularly by the Management 
Board. The policy defines the liquidity 
risk limits which are applied to the 
Group”.
n.s.a n.s.a “Routine reporting is 
in place to senior 
management and 
through the Group's 
committee structure”
n.s.a
Management 
structure for 
liquidity strategy
-Short term liquidity
-Unsecured funding
-Asset liquidity
-Stress testing and Scenario analysis
n.s.a “Barclays Treasury operates a centralized 
governance and
control process that covers all of the 
Group’s liquidity risk
Management activities”. 
-the group asset and 
liability committee 
-the senior asset and 
liability committee
-structural liquidity risk
-tactical liquidity risk
-contingent liquidity risk
Adequate 
Information 
system.
“Our cash flow based reporting system 
provides daily liquidity risk information 
to global and regional management”.
n.s.a n.s.a n.s.a n.s.a
Tactical risk 
management
“It then covers tactical liquidity risk 
management dealing with the access to 
secured and unsecured funding sources”.
n.s.a “Execution of the Group's liquidity risk 
management strategy is carried out at 
country level within agreed policies, 
controls and limits, with the Country 
Treasurer providing reports directly to 
Barclays Treasury to evidence conformance 
with the agreed risk profile”
n.s.a “From a tactical, short-term 
perspective the liquidity risk 
resulting from the short term 
cash and collateral positions is 
managed”.
Strategic risk 
management
“Finally, the strategic perspective 
comprises the maturity profile of all 
assets and liabilities (Funding Matrix) on 
our balance sheet and our issuance 
strategy”.
n.s.a “The objective of the Group's liquidity risk 
management strategy is to ensure that the 
funding profile of individual businesses and 
the Group as a whole is appropriate to 
underlying market conditions and the 
profile of our business in each given 
country.”
n.s.a n.s.a
Notes: n.s.a: not specifically applicable. Source (author’s synthesis)
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Table IV. Measuring and monitoring net funding requirements.
Liquidity Management 
Principle(s)
Deutsche  Bank UBS Barclays Bank Plc Lloyds Banking Group 
plc
ING
Establishment of 
measuring and 
monitoring process 
“Our reporting system tracks 
cash flows on a daily basis 
over an 18-month horizon. 
This system allows 
management to assess our 
short-term liquidity position in 
each location, region and 
globally on a by-currency, by-
product and by-division basis. 
The system captures all of our 
cash flows from transactions 
on our balance sheet, as well 
as liquidity risks resulting 
from off-balance sheet 
transactions”.
n.s.a “The need to monitor, manage 
and control intraday liquidity 
in real time is recognized by 
the Group as a critical process: 
any failure to meet specific 
intraday commitments would 
have significant consequences, 
such as a visible market 
disruption”.
“Liquidity is actively 
monitored at business unit and 
Group level at an appropriate 
frequency. Routine reporting 
is in place to senior 
management and through the 
Group's committee structure, 
in particular the group asset 
and liability committee and 
the senior asset and liability 
committee which meet 
monthly”.
“For the measurement and 
monitoring of the actual 
liquidity position the focus is 
on the daily cash and collateral 
position”.
Use of “what if” 
scenarios.
“In addition, we keep a 
dedicated strategic liquidity 
reserve containing highly 
liquid and central bank 
eligible securities in major 
currencies around the world to 
support our liquidity profile in 
case of potential deteriorating 
market conditions”.
n.s.a “These stress scenarios 
include Barclays-specific 
scenarios such as an 
unexpected rating downgrade 
and operational problems, and 
external scenarios such as 
Emerging Market crises, 
payment system disruption 
and macro-economic shocks”.
“Firstly, the Group stress tests 
its potential cash flow 
mismatch position under 
various scenarios on an 
ongoing basis”.
“For this purpose ING Bank’s 
weekly and monthly liquidity 
positions are stress tested 
under a scenario that is a mix 
between a market event and an 
ING specific event”.
Review of liquidity 
management 
assumptions.
“As of year-end 2009 we have 
implemented a new reporting 
system which focuses on 
contractual cash flows from 
wholesale funding sources on 
a daily basis over a 12-month 
horizon”.
n.s.a n.s.a “The scenarios and the 
assumptions are reviewed at 
least annually to gain 
assurance they continue to be 
relevant to the nature of the 
business”.
n.s.a
Notes: n.s.a: not specifically applicable. Source (author’s synthesis)
11
Table V. Managing market access and contingency planning
Liquidity 
Management 
Principle(s)
Deutsche  Bank UBS Barclays Bank Plc Lloyds Banking Group 
plc
ING
Managing 
market access
“Unsecured funding is measured on a 
regional basis by currency and 
aggregated to a global utilization report. 
The management board approves limits 
to protect our access to unsecured 
funding at attractive 
levels”…….“Liquidity outflow limits 
(Maximum Cash Outflow Limits), 
which have been set to limit cumulative 
global and local cash outflows, are 
monitored on a daily basis to safeguard 
our access to liquidity”.
n.s.a “The Group maintains a 
portfolio of highly marketable 
assets including UK, US and 
Euro-area government bonds 
that can be sold or funded on a 
secured basis as protection 
against any unforeseen 
interruption to cash flow.”
“Additionally, unsecured 
funding is managed within 
specific term limits. The term 
of unsecured liabilities has 
been extended, with average 
life improving by four months 
from eight months at the end 
of December 2007 to 12 
months at the end of 
December 2008”.
n.s.a “Holding a broad portfolio of 
highly marketable assets that 
can be used to obtain secured 
funding”.
 “Maintaining an adequate 
structural liquidity gap taking 
into account the asset mix and 
both the secured and 
unsecured funding 
possibilities of ING Bank”.
Contingency 
planning
“The strategic liquidity reserve amounts 
to EUR 54.9 billion as of December 31, 
2009. This reserve is held in addition to 
the bank’s cash balance and the 
collateral the bank needs to support its 
clearing activities in euro, U.S. dollars 
and other currencies which are held in 
separate portfolios around the globe”.
“Combined with the broad 
diversity of its funding 
sources, its contingency 
planning processes and its 
global scope, these additional 
measures have proven 
extremely helpful in enabling 
UBS to maintain a balanced 
asset / liability profile, in spite 
of this period of 
unprecedented market 
dislocation”.
“The output informs both the 
liquidity mismatch limits and 
the Group's contingency 
funding plan. This is 
maintained by Treasury and is 
aligned with the Group and 
country business resumption 
plans to encompass decision-
making authorities, internal 
and external communication 
and, in the event of a systems 
failure, the restoration of 
liquidity management and 
payment systems”.
“the Group has a contingency 
funding plan embedded within 
the Group Liquidity Policy 
which has been designed to 
identify emerging liquidity 
concerns at an early stage, so 
that mitigating actions can be 
taken to avoid a more serious 
crisis developing”.
“Contingency liquidity risk 
relates to the organization and 
planning for liquidity 
management in times of stress. 
Within ING a specific crisis 
team is responsible for the 
liquidity management in times 
of crisis”.
Stress testing
“Stress testing is fully integrated in our 
liquidity risk management framework. 
We track contractual cash flows per 
currency and product over an eight-week 
horizon (which we consider the most 
critical time span in a liquidity crisis) 
and apply the relevant stress case to all 
potential risk drivers from on balance 
sheet and off balance sheet products. 
Beyond the eight week time horizon we 
analyze on a quarterly basis the impact 
of a change of business model out to 12 
“This involves monitoring its 
contractual and behavioral 
maturity profiles, projecting 
and modeling its liquidity 
exposures under various stress 
scenarios and monitoring its 
secured funding capacity.”
“Stress testing is undertaken 
to assess and plan for the 
impact of various scenarios 
which may put the Group's 
liquidity at risk.” 
"Treasury develops and 
monitors a range of stress tests 
on the Group's projected cash 
flows. These stress scenarios 
include Barclays-specific 
“the Group stress tests its 
potential cash flow mismatch 
position under various 
scenarios on an ongoing 
basis.”
“Behavioral adjustments are 
developed, evaluating how the 
cash flow position might 
change under each stress 
scenario to derive a stressed 
cash flow position. Scenarios 
cover both Lloyds Banking 
“For stress testing purposes 
the liquidity risk positions are 
calculated in line with the 
regulatory reporting 
requirements for liquidity risk 
of the Dutch Central Bank”.
12
months. The liquidity stress testing 
provides the basis for the bank’s 
contingency funding plans which are 
approved by the Management Board. 
Our stress testing analysis assesses our 
ability to generate sufficient liquidity 
under critical conditions and has been a 
valuable input when defining our target 
liquidity risk position. The analysis is 
performed monthly”.
scenarios such as an 
unexpected rating downgrade 
and operational problems, and 
external scenarios such as 
Emerging Market crises, 
payment system disruption 
and macro-economic shocks. 
The output informs both the 
liquidity mismatch limits and 
the Group's contingency 
funding plan.” 
Group name specific and 
systemic difficulties”.
Scenario 
analysis
“As of year-end 2009 we also have 
introduced a scenario which combines a 
systemic market shock with a multi 
notch rating downgrade. 
Under each of these scenarios we 
assume that all maturing loans to 
customers will need to be rolled over 
and require funding whereas rollover of 
liabilities will be partially impaired 
resulting in a funding gap. We then 
model the steps we would take to 
counterbalance the resulting net shortfall 
in funding. Countermeasures would 
include the bank’s long cash balance and 
unencumbered asset inventory as well as 
our Strategic Liquidity Reserve”….. 
“The scenarios have been based on 
historic events, such as the 1987 stock 
market crash, the 1990 U.S. liquidity 
crunch and the September 2001 terrorist 
attacks, liquidity crisis case studies and 
hypothetical events. Also incorporated 
are new liquidity risk drivers revealed 
by the latest financial markets crisis: 
prolonged term money-market freeze, 
collateral repudiation, limited fungibility 
of currencies, stranded syndications, 
systemic knock-on effects and further 
liquidity risk drivers such as intraday 
liquidity risk”.
“This involves monitoring its 
contractual and behavioral 
maturity profiles, projecting 
and modeling its liquidity 
exposures under various stress 
scenarios  and monitoring its 
secured funding capacity”.
“For this purpose ING Bank’s 
weekly and monthly liquidity 
positions are stress tested 
under a scenario that is a mix 
between a market event and an 
ING specific event.”
Notes: n.s.a: not specifically applicable. Source (author’s synthesis)
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 Table VI. Role of internal control, supervisors and public disclosure; in improving liquidity risk management.
Liquidity Management 
Principle(s)
Deutsche  Bank UBS Barclays Bank Plc Lloyds Banking Group 
plc
ING
Internal control
“As of year-end 2009 we have 
implemented a new reporting 
system which focuses on 
contractual cash flows from 
wholesale funding sources on 
a daily basis over a 12-month 
horizon. The system captures 
all cash flows from unsecured 
as well as from secured 
funding transactions. 
Wholesale funding limits, 
which are calibrated against 
our stress testing results and 
approved by the Management 
Board; describe our maximum 
tolerance for liquidity risk. 
These limits apply to the 
cumulative global cash 
outflows and are monitored on 
a daily basis”.
n.s.a n.s.a “Liquidity is actively 
monitored at business unit and 
Group level at an appropriate 
frequency. Routine reporting 
is in place to senior 
management and through the 
Group's committee structure, 
in particular the group asset 
and liability committee and 
the senior asset and liability 
committee which meet 
monthly”.
n.s.a
Role of supervisors
Management directors are 
mentioned three times in a 
supervising role. No 
intermediate supervisors are 
disclosed.
n.s.a n.s.a “Routine reporting is in place 
to senior management and 
through the Group's 
committee structure, in 
particular the group asset and 
liability committee and the 
senior asset and liability 
committee which meet 
monthly. In a stress situation 
the level of monitoring and 
reporting is increased 
commensurate with the nature 
of the stress event”.
n.s.a
Public disclosure  World Wide Web World Wide Web World Wide Web World Wide Web World Wide Web
Notes: n.s.a: not specifically applicable. Source (author’s synthesis
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5. Discussion of Results 
Much discussion on analyzed content of disclosures will be monotonous; as it will 
simply  be  literally  recycling  what  is  already  much  explicit  and  self  explanatory  on 
synthetic  tables  (III,  IV, V and VI).  As regards  developing a structure  for managing 
liquidity (Table III), Deutsche Bank appears to provide the must exhaustive information; 
among these, that which, all five banks take very seriously, is an intra day LRM strategy. 
The presence of an adequate information system is seldom elucidated (but for Deutsche 
Bank).  Regarding net funding requirements,  only UBS appears  to  be on the sideline. 
However,  this  difference  is  not  any  relevant  when  it  comes  to  ‘market  access  and 
contingency planning”; which, all five disclosing banks take very seriously. As to what 
concerns the ‘role of internal  control,  supervisors and public disclosure; in improving 
liquidity management’, only Deutsche Bank and Lloyds Banking Group plc account for.
6. Conclusion
Our  attempt  to  probe  into  post-crisis  liquidity  risk  management  disclosure; 
following  pre-crisis  shortcomings  emphasized  by  the  Basel  committee  on  banking 
supervision  have  yielded  results,  not  unexpected.  The  low  rate  of  bank  disclosure 
confirms  a  study  by  Chen  and  Hassan(2006),  which  shows  that,  banks  do  not  take 
seriously,  improvements in transparency of the banking system because it could breed 
chances of a contagious  bank run.  Our results  also comply with Cordella and Yeyati 
(1998), from the prism that; full disclosure of bank risks could lead to bank failure via 
increasing  interest  rate.  A  further  emphasis  on  relevance  of  results  with  respect  to 
literature could be appreciated from Adamti and Pfleiderer (2000), on the premise that: 
disclosure  of  negative  information  could  engender  a  contagious  run  and  systematic 
collapse; especially when correlation between elements of the banking sector is highly 
positive. In response to hypotheses we put forward at on-set, we can conclude (based on 
liquidity risk management):  (1) with respect to the World Wide Web, banks have not 
adopted more appealing post crisis disclosure principles; (2) country regulatory systems 
don’t  affect  disclosure  patterns  ;(3)  disclosure  doesn’t  seem  to  be  any  relevant  in 
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determining the content of stakeholder confidence; as banks do not still consider severe 
and prolonged liquidity disruptions as very likely.
As a policy implication; like in the run-up to the previous financial crisis, 
if banks are not compelled to explicitly and expressly disclose what measures they adopt 
in a bid to guarantee stakeholder liquidity ; the onset of any financial turmoil would only 
precipitate a meltdown. 
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